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“Why were some more inclined than others to release their gold fetters?” 
(Eichengreen 1992, p. 23). This paper takes up Eichengreen’s question with respect to 
the European continent. Every European country, which was involved in some form 
of a currency crisis in the wake of the Great Depression, developed its own 
historiography and traditions, focussing most often on the crucial time-frame 
immediately before the exit took place. However, there exists surprisingly little 
comparative work on the currency crises of the interwar years. In particular, there are 
few studies that link up with the recent theoretical literature on currency crises and 
none that makes an effort to test those theories systematically against the data. In this 
paper I propose discrete time survival models based on monthly observations as a 
simple framework to bridge the gap between country-specific narratives, existing 
comparative studies, and recent theoretical approaches to currency crises.  
 
In his fundamental work of the interwar gold-exchange standard, Eichengreen 
(1992) argued that it was the failure to coordinate monetary policies that prevented 
countries to adjust to a first wave of deflationary shocks in the late 1920s. Here, the 
currency crises of the early 1930s are essentially rooted in the existence of a monetary 
policy tri-lemma, where the fixed exchange rates under the gold standard came under 
simultaneous pressure from capital flight and domestic calls for expansionary 
monetary policies. Tightening monetary conditions in the US spilled over into capital 
importing countries in their attempt to prevent capital outflows without imposing 
capital controls. The implied deflation placed these countries between Scylla and 
Charybdis, as real wages and real interest rates increased to unseen levels: in an 
attempt to rescue the currency and access to foreign capital, they wrecked their 
economies.  According to Simmons (1994) World War One undermined the political 
tolerance for domestic adjustment: a defence of the gold standard against pressure 
from international capital markets via tightening monetary policy was less feasible 
after 1918. She uses binary choice models to show that variations in the pattern of exit 
from the interwar gold-exchange standard can be explained partly by variations in 
domestic political and institutional conditions. James (2001) extends the basic 
narrative to include the collapse of world trade and restrictions on international labour 
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that, at least in some cases, country-specific structural weaknesses in the financial 
sector conditioned and deepened the currency crisis. Besides many country studies, 
there have been recently two further attempts for a comparative cross-country analysis 
of the collapse of the interwar gold-exchange standard, namely H. Wolf and Yousef 
(2005), and Wandschneider (2005). They both attempt to generalise the experience of 
a large set of countries in a comparative framework and use duration analysis to test 
for the empirical relevance of several hypotheses. While this is a promising approach, 
the theoretical background of the tested hypotheses remains somewhat unclear. 
Moreover, both studies limit attention to annual data only and focus on a quite narrow 
class of duration models. 
 
For this paper I collected a new panel of monthly observations for several 
European economies over the 1928 to 1936 period. The data allow tracing of the 
various economic pressures that led to an exit from the gold-exchange standard for a 
panel of countries over the crucial months from May 1931, when the Austrian 
Creditanstalt collapsed, over the German “twin crisis” of June 1931, to Britain’s 
decision to leave gold in September 1931. Hence, monthly data allow exploring the 
time structure of exit decisions in much more detail, which will help to connect to the 
various country-specific literatures. The geographical focus is on Central Europe, 
namely Germany, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, with their large direct 
neighbours France, Sweden and Italy. This selection of countries is in part due to the 
availability of comparable monthly time series data. On the other hand it covers most 
of the variation in exit decisions across the European continent: Germany left the 
gold-exchange standard in July 1931, soon followed by the Habsburg successors 
Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia and also Sweden in September 1931; instead, Italy 
left gold only in 1934, while France in the west and Poland in the east adhered to the 
gold-exchange standard until the end in 1936.  
 
Is it possible to explain this curious pattern systematically, in a coherent 
theoretical framework? The modern literature on currency crises might provide useful 
insights for the interwar period. It has become standard to distinguish between first-, 
second, and third-generation models of currency crises, which are not mutually 
exclusive. Briefly, in first generation models in the spirit of Krugman (1979) countries 
  3face currency crises when a currency peg becomes unsustainable due to some 
developments in fundamental macroeconomic variables, which cause large capital 
outflows. This is clearly related to Eichengreen (1992), who argued that for European 
capital importers a key factor was tightening monetary policy in the main capital 
exporting country that changed macroeconomic fundamentals in capital importing 
countries. However, many other “conditioning” factors have been proposed in more 
country-specific arguments, which can be framed in “first-generation models”, such 
as the return to gold at unsustainable parities (Keynes 1925, Redmond 1982, Sicsic 
1992), changes in the seniority of reparation debt from the Dawes Plan of 1924 
onwards (Ritschl 2002), or growing current account deficits due to exogenous 
changes in the structure of world trade (Svennilson 1954).  
 
Second generation models in the tradition of Obstfeld (1986), stress the impact 
of market expectations rather than the role of macroeconomic fundamentals – while 
obviously the two are tightly interrelated. According to these models, a currency crisis 
occurs due to either self-fulfilling expectations, herd behaviour based on incomplete 
information, or contagion. Related to this, Calvo and Reinhart (2001, 2002) have 
argued that developing countries are reluctant to tolerate much variation in exchange 
rates due to a “fear of floating” that mainly stems from a lack of credibility and the 
fear to loose access to capital markets. This corresponds to the argument for Interwar 
Europe that policymakers were eager to join the gold standard to import credibility 
(Bordo et al. 1999). Moreover both policymakers and their electorates may have 
differed in their adhesion to monetary orthodoxy (their “mentality”) because of their 
own recent experience. In countries which suffered a hyperinflation or a significant 
depreciation of their currencies relative to the pre-war parities, one can expect a wide 
reluctance to adopt expansionary monetary policies (Eichengreen and Temin 1997, 
see also Mouré 2002 for France or Knakiewicz 1967 for Poland). Moreover, this 
should be related to issues like central bank independence, for example because the 
perceived risk of expansionary monetary policies to produce hyperinflation may be 
smaller the less directly a government can affect monetary policy (Simmons 1994).   
Finally, third generation models have evolved along two lines, namely random 
withdrawal models (Chang and Velasco, 1998) and moral hazard models (McKinnon 
and Huw, 1996, Krugman, 1998). These models highlight that structural problems in 
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the first place but also the character and length of the currency crisis. Hence, the 
models allow for the possibility of a simultaneous currency and banking crisis – a 
“twin crisis”, which is obviously related to the discussion about a German “twin 
crisis” in 1931 (James 1984, Schnabel 2004, Temin 2008). But there is a much more 
general point to make (Bernanke 1995, Calvo et al. 2006): in the presence of 
rigidities, especially nominal wage-stickiness and non-contingent financial contracts, 
price deflation would cause significant increases in real wages and in real debt – Irwin 
Fisher (1933) discussed the latter in the context for the Great Depression as “Debt 
Deflation”. While a rise in real wages would tend to increase unemployment and 
hence foster political pressure on monetary policy, debt deflation can trigger a wave 
of bankruptcies in highly indebted sectors. Clearly, together these factors can bring 
about a “twin crisis”. 
A straightforward way to test the relevance of these various models is to 
estimate the probability of exit from the interwar gold-exchange system as a function 
of cross-sectional and time series variation in a set of explanatory variables. Instead of 
using more specific “duration models”, my empirical strategy is based on an 
econometric framework that nests various discrete time survival models, which allows 
to test for different forms of duration dependence and distributions, rather than to 
assume them.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II discusses in more detail 
how first- to third-generation models of currency-crises correspond to the various 
hypotheses from the literature on interwar Europe. Section III motivates my empirical 
strategy to test the empirical relevance of those hypotheses based on discrete time 
survival models. It includes a s a brief description of the data and the definition of 
variables. Section IV presents the main empirical results from my analysis. Based on 
this background, section V illustrates briefly for the cases of France and Poland how 
these results can be put back into the context of some country-specific debates. 
Section VI concludes.  
  5II. Hypotheses on the Exit Pattern and Models of Currency Crises 
 
Possible explanations for the observed variation in European exit decisions 
abound. They tend to be rather complex and more often than not have been proposed 
to explain the experience of specific countries rather than the overall pattern. In this 
section, I briefly survey the key features of the various “generations” of models of 
currency crises that dominate the literature. I show how these relate to various 
hypotheses put forward in the historical literature and thereby, how they can structure 
our comparative analysis.  
 
First generation models in the spirit of Krugman (1979) generate a currency 
crisis when an existing currency peg becomes unsustainable due to large capital 
outflows, which in turn are triggered by some developments in “fundamental” 
macroeconomic variables. The fundamentals proposed in the recent literature include 
excessively expansionary monetary policy, large and growing balance of payment 
deficits, excessive investments in high-risk and low-profit projects, but also 
deficiencies in regulation. These factors can widen the gap between the proclaimed 
goals of monetary policy (for example defending a fixed exchange rate) on the one 
hand side, and the means to keep these promises on the other, and thereby undermine 
the credibility of monetary authorities. Sometimes, this kind of crisis is referred to as 
a “fundamental crisis”. 
 
Second generation models, for example Obstfeld (1986), build on Krugman 
(1979) but stress that even if the development of fundamental variables is not 
particularly unfavourable, a currency crisis can occur due to - for example - self-
fulfilling expectations, herding behaviour or contagion. Essentially, the government 
weights the benefits from adherence to a currency peg (such as the possibility to 
import credibility to fight inflation) to those against the peg (such as the possibility to 
pursue a monetary policy according to domestic policy objectives) and these weights 
will change with the arrival of new information. In Obstfeld (1986), a crisis can occur 
when the loss arising from maintaining the current regime is considered to be at least 
as large as the combined loss from discretionary policy and the associated loss in 
credibility. Related to this, Calvo and Reinhart (2001, 2002) have argued that 
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a “fear of floating” that mainly stems from a lack of credibility and the fear to loose 
access to capital markets. In models with coherent self-fulfilling expectations, there 
are multiple steady states in exchange rates and monetary policy. The arrival of “bad 
news” from official statistics or changes in the political conditions can move the 
economy from one steady state to another. Herding models in turn are based on the 
idea that gathering information is costly. When the majority of participants behaves 
adaptively and follows big participants in their behaviour, small random shocks to the 
latter can have large effects. Similarly, regional linkages through trade or financial 
relations can cause crisis contagion, as a crisis in one region will adversely affect the 
macroeconomic fundamentals – or at least the perception thereof - in the second 
region (which is not necessarily the geographical neighbour).  
Third generation models have evolved along two lines, namely random 
withdrawal models (Chang and Velasco, 1998) and moral hazard models (McKinnon 
and Huw, 1996, Krugman, 1998), and we will focus on the latter. These models 
highlight that structural problems in the banking and financial sector can affect the 
probability that currency crises occur in the first place but also the character and 
length of the currency crisis. Hence, the models allow for the possibility of a 
simultaneous currency and banking crisis – a “twin crisis”. For example, in Krugman 
(1998), the government guarantees investments in companies for banks that are 
mainly branch offices of foreign banks or whose business strategy relies mainly on 
borrowing money in international capital markets to extend loans to domestic 
companies. The incentive for the government to issue guarantees comes from an 
attempt to attract foreign investment. However, when the government fails to regulate 
and control financial agents, serious problems of moral hazard can make the country 
prone to a banking crisis that will turn into a currency crisis as foreign funds are 
withdrawn. While such a model can be useful to understand the simultaneity of 
banking and currency crisis in the interwar context, there is a much more general 
point to make, related to the recent debate on “Phoenix miracles” (Calvo et al. 2006): 
in the presence of rigidities, especially nominal wage-stickiness and non-contingent 
financial contracts, price deflation would cause significant increases in real wages and 
in real debt – Irwin Fisher (1933) discussed the latter in the context for the Great 
Depression as “Debt Deflation” (see Bernanke 1995). While a rise in real wages 
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policy, debt deflation can trigger a wave of bankruptcies in highly indebted sectors 
and adversely affect private banks as their main creditors. Together this might 
produce a “twin crisis” with both banks and currency under pressure. 
These models are not mutually exclusive but rather stress different aspects of 
currency crisis, notably all in the framework of the macroeconomic policy tri-lemma. 
Several hypotheses that have featured prominently in the empirical literature on the 
currency crises of the early 1930s correspond broadly to these models, so that they 
can guide a comparative analysis. Let us start with aspects mentioned in third 
generation models of currency crisis, where banking and currency crises occur jointly. 
Many authors have argued that countries experiencing bad macroeconomic shocks 
(either from within or from outside) tended to deteriorate their economic situation 
when pursuing monetary orthodoxy according to the rules of the gold-exchange 
standard. Such a monetary policy reaction resulted in sharp price deflation, which in 
turn pushed up real wages, real interest rates and hence real debt, and caused growing 
unemployment, a slump in industrial production, and a wave in bankruptcies (Newell 
an Symons 1988, Bernanke and James 1991). An early exit might have allowed 
following expansionary monetary policies and thereby may have helped the economy 
to recover, possibly even without any recovery in domestic credit similar to a 
“Phoenix miracle” (Eichengreen and Sachs 1985, Calvo et al. 2006). The punch line 
here is that a large deflationary shock alone has the potential to trigger a “twin crisis” 
under a fixed exchange rate regime due to the twin pressure on domestic monetary 
policy to counter unemployment and pressure on private banks from increasingly 
indebted sectors suffering from debt deflation (Fisher 1933). Moreover, third 
generation models such a Krugman (1998) are obviously related to the ongoing 
discussion about a German “twin crisis” in 1931 (James 1984, Schnabel 2004, Temin 
2008). The argument here is (see James 1984, Schnabel 2004) that in the German case 
a banking crisis preceded and possibly caused the currency crisis of July 1931, rooted 
in some structural weaknesses in Germany’s financial sector similar to the moral 
hazard problems in Krugman (1998). This has been questioned by Temin (2008) who 
agued that it was rather banks reacting to a looming currency crisis than banks 
causing a currency crisis.  
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generation model of currency crisis. More generally, he refers to Grossmann (1994) as 
evidence that adherence to the gold standard as such made banks vulnerable during 
the early 1930s. The evidence in Grossman (1994) is actually not conclusive on this 
question. It rather indicates that countries helped to stabilise their banking sector by 
leaving gold early - which is difficult to be squared with Temin (2008). Nevertheless, 
it has been argued that for European capital importers in general a key factor was 
tightening monetary policy in the main capital exporter country, the US (Eichengreen 
1992). This changed macroeconomic fundamentals in those countries, namely their 
access to capital and put their exchange rates under pressure. In addition, several 
factors have been proposed in more country-specific arguments, which can be framed 
in first-generation models as producing unsustainable developments in 
macroeconomic variables. One such factor is the return to gold at unsustainable 
parities (Keynes 1925, Redmond 1982, Sicsic 1992).  While Britain returned to gold 
at the pre-war parity, the French Franc had lost 80% of its pre-war value when the 
gold-standard was officially re-established in 1928. It has been argued that this left the 
pound Sterling overvalued and the Franc Poincaré undervalued and caused large 
flows of gold and capital from Britain to France. This capital drain and the 
competitive disadvantage from high export prices made the British economy more 
vulnerable to bad macroeconomic shocks than the French economy, and hence can be 
understood as a “conditioning” factor for the occurrence of currency crises. Another 
“conditioning” factor has been proposed by Ritschl (2002) more specifically for 
Germany, namely changes in the seniority of reparation debt from the Dawes Plan of 
1924 to the Young Plan of 1929. While under the Dawes Plan reparation debt was de 
facto junior to commercial debt due to the so-called “transfer protection”, this 
changed in early 1929 with first information about new rules under the Young Plan. 
The argument is that now senior reparation debt blocked Germany’s access to foreign 
capital markets, a credit constraint that started to bind exactly at the onset of the Great 
Depression. Not at least, it has been stated that Europe’s competitive position in world 
markets weakened during and after World War One, and especially European 
exporters of agricultural produce faced increasing difficulties from the mid-1920s 
onwards (Lewis 1949). While challenged by Federico (2005), the idea that changes in 
the world trading system left the European economies more vulnerable – or that it 
“conditioned” the probability of some wider crisis on the continent - still features 
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interwar economy see Findlay and O’Rourke 2007). 
 
Several arguments correspond to second generation models, especially to the 
ideas of credibility, self-fulfilling expectations and contagion. The promise of 
recovery from releasing the golden fetters had to be weighted against a possible loss 
in credibility as argued in Bordo, Edelstein and Rockoff (1999). As stated for 
developing countries in recent times by Calvo and Reinhart (2001, 2002), there is 
evidence for a “fear of floating” among many countries in Interwar Europe. 
According to Bordo et al. (1999) the interwar gold standard continued to serve as a 
“good housekeeping” seal of approval especially for peripheral countries – or, for this 
matter, new states such as Poland or Czechoslovakia, without a track record of 
monetary policy. These results have been questioned by Taylor and Obstfeld (2003) 
and they may well have been time-dependent: the more core-countries left the gold 
standard during the Great Depression, the weaker the credibility signal of adherence 
may have become (H. Wolf and Yousef 2005). Actually, as argued in Drazen and 
Masson (1994), policymakers may have hurt rather than enhanced their credibility in 
the markets through policies that appear “tough” but not sustainable in the long-run. 
Also, policymakers and their electorates may have differed in their adhesion to 
monetary orthodoxy (their “mentality”) because of their own recent experience 
(Eichengreen and Temin 1997). In countries which suffered a hyperinflation or a 
significant depreciation of their currencies relative to the pre-war parities, one can 
expect a wide reluctance to adopt expansionary monetary policies. For example, this 
is the most widespread explanation to understand Poland’s belated exit (esp. 
Knakiewicz 1967), but features also in explanations for French adherence to gold 
(Mouré 2002). Simmons (1994) argued that these factors need to be related to the 
prevailing institutions, such as central bank independence. For example, the perceived 
risk of expansionary monetary policies to produce hyperinflation may be smaller the 
less directly a government can affect monetary policy (Kydland and Prescott 1977). 
More importantly, Simmons (1994) and others stressed that the political system 
prevailing in a country may have affected a country’s choice of monetary policy. The 
extension of the franchise (James 2001) and political instability (Eichengreen and 
Simmons 1995) might have weakened the ability of governments to commit to the 
rules of the gold standard. Authoritarian regimes in turn might have had tools at hand 
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expansionary full employment policies. This ability to defend the gold standard may 
have also increased with the weight of agriculture in the economy, insofar as political 
parties demanding expansionary monetary policies tended to have their electorate in 
industrial centres. 
 
A final set of arguments can be linked to the idea of contagion in second 
generation models: the degree of economic integration between country pairs differed 
widely during the interwar years. For example, the crisis of the Austrian Credit-
Anstalt in May 1931 is typically seen as the immediate trigger for the Hungarian crisis 
that lead to the exit from gold (see Ellis 1939, p. 88) and many argued that there were 
elements of contagion from Austria into the German banking system (Born 1967, 
Schnabel 2004). In contrast, spill-over effects into Italy were apparently limited, 
which is partly explained by government intervention (Feinstein et al. 1997) and 
partly by a more limited degree of financial integration. Similarly, exchange rate 
stabilization may have dominated other monetary policy goals in the presence of tight 
trade relations. For example countries which traded intensively with the UK might 
have had stronger incentives to follow Britain off gold in 1931 than others, while 
integration with France may have had the opposite effect (Ritschl and Wolf 2003). 
Straumann and Woitek (2006) argue that the monetary policy pursued by the Swedish 
Riksbank - which has been praised as a predecessor of modern inflation targeting 
(Svensson1995, Fregert and Jonung 2004) - can been largely explained by the attempt 
to stabilize the exchange rate with sterling. Hence, the exit decision of major trading 
partners could force a country to leave as well.  
 
III. Empirical Strategy: discrete time duration model with monthly data 
 
  A simple and straightforward way to test the empirical relevance of these 
various hypotheses is to estimate the probability at a specific time t of exiting the 
interwar gold exchange system as a function of cross-sectional and time series 
variation in a set of explanatory variables. I use monthly data for January 1928 to 
December 1936 to track the time-path of potential explanatory variables as closely as 
possible.  
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While the use of monthly data is certainly preferable to annual data, we 
obviously still have to deal with a discrete time framework. The discrete hazard 
function  λi(t) that gives the instantaneous probability of exit of country i (given 
survival up to that point) is modelled as follows: 
 
(1)   ) ) ( ), ( ( ) ( t X t g t ij i i γ β λ = , 
 
where β denotes the baseline hazard, Xij is a vector of monthly explanatory 
variables (j=1..k) specific to country i and γi a vector of  variable-specific parameters. 
The function g(.) is a link function for which we will assume various specifications. 
This modelling of the hazard function results from the equivalence between a large 
class of discrete time survival models and sequential models (see Fahrmeir and Tutz 
2001, Chapter 9). 
 
Here, the baseline hazard β captures the basic idea of duration dependence and 
could be specified as a constant or as a function of the time already spent on the gold-
standard in a linear or nonlinear form. For example, with positive duration 
dependence, the probability to exit would increase with the time already spent on 
gold. However, note that most of the hypotheses put forward to explain the pattern of 
exit from gold concern the “conditioning” various factors X – the factors that 
condition the baseline hazard, while the idea of duration dependence in the pattern of 
exit from gold lacks (so far) a straightforward theoretical underpinning. Nevertheless, 
we will see below how positive duration dependence might be interpreted as capturing 
some of the hypotheses mentioned in section II. The idea is rather to test explicitly for 
the impact of various forms of duration dependence on exit probabilities rather than 
simply to assume some form of duration dependence as done elsewhere. This 
recommendation also follows from Heckman and Singer (1984, pp. 77-83) who argue 
that single spell duration models in time-inhomogeneous environments (as in the 
current context) may face identification problems, among other things because it can 
be difficult to separate duration dependence per se from the effects of time varying 
variables (Heckman and Singer 1984, p. 82). One might expect identification 
problems especially for variables with a linear time trend over the sample period. In 
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more closely to the theoretical literature. 
 
I will evaluate two possible specifications of the link function that have 
received considerable attention in empirical survival analysis: first, a logistic 
specification, which is equivalent to a proportional odds model (Thompson 1977) and 
second a “log-log” or extreme value specification, which is equivalent to a 
proportional hazards model in discrete time (Cox 1972, see also Fahrmeir and Tutz 
2001). For example, the former has been used in the study by Klein and Marion 
(1997) on the duration of exchange-rate pegs, while the latter is widespread in studies 
on the determinants of unemployment spells (Narendranathan and Stewart 1993), but 
has also been recently applied to the analysis of exchange rate regimes (Waelti 2005) 
or the duration of trade relations (Besedes and Prusa 2006). When we denote survival 
time by T and the time of exit by T = t, the discrete hazard for the proportional odds 
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Similarly, the discrete time hazard for the proportional hazard model (as proposed by 
Cox 1972) is given by 
 
(3)   )). exp( exp( 1 ) , ( Pr ) ( X x t T t T ob x t t γ β λ + − − = ≥ = =  
 
As shown in Thompson (1977), the two models become very similar when the 
grouping intervals (the difference between discrete points in time) become short. In 
both formulations, the elements of the γ vector approximate the partial elasticities of 
the likelihood to exit the gold standard with respect to the vector of variables Xt.  
 
In the empirical analysis I will explore how the various factors suggested in 
the literature affect the probability to exit from the gold-exchange standard under 
different assumptions on the form of both, the baseline hazard and the link function. 
The estimated models are then evaluated based on the conventional indicators 
  13(McFadden R
2, Akaike and Schwarz criteria) and also by their ability to correctly 
predict the very month of exit from gold.  
 
The mentioned hypotheses are tested against the data for eight European 
countries over the period January 1928 through December 1936, namely for the five 
largest countries in central Europe (Austria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Hungary, and 
Poland) and their neighbours France, Italy and Sweden. The list of countries included 
is mainly determined by the availability of a complete data panel for key variables 
(and should be extended in future research), but it comprises the whole range of 
monetary policy choices as observed during the interwar years. Austria, 
Czechoslovakia, Germany Hungary, and Sweden all left the gold standard between 
July and September 1931, but arguably these decisions were driven by different 
factors. Italy stayed on gold until mid 1934, Poland until April 1936 and France until 
September 1936. Only Switzerland stayed longer on gold (December 1936). 
Following Klein and Marion (1997) and others, the dependent variable equals zero in 
any month when the country adheres to the gold standard and equals one in the month 
that the spell ends. After the spell has ended, the country drops out of the sample. I 
will define “exit” as either the imposition of exchange controls or devaluation 
(whatever occurred earlier). The explanatory variables are always introduced with a 
one-month time lag, and I will now describe, how they are defined. 
 
To start with, the simple idea that the probability to exit should depend on how 
badly the economy was hit by deflationary shocks I collected monthly data on 
wholesale prices (whole28) indexed to 1928 = 100. Note that the use of index data 
eliminates the cross-sectional variation in levels of prices as of 1928, due to data 
limitations. Price deflation in turn may have raised unemployment directly via rising 
real wages, or indirectly via rising indebtedness of vulnerable sectors and declining 
industrial production. To test for these effects I collected monthly data on industrial 
production (ind28, indexed to 1928 = 100) and on rates of unemployment that refer to 
the number of registered unemployed over the total economically active population in 
order to ensure comparability between countries. I will use both, unadjusted rates of 
unemployment (unrate) and rates adjusted for seasonal fluctuations by the X12 
seasonal adjustment method (unrate_x12). Note that an increase in unemployment 
and a decline in industrial output should be largely endogenous to changes in price 
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simultaneously.  
 
Next, I collected monthly data on bank deposits, again indexed to 1928 = 100, 
to capture the occurrence of a banking crisis (banking). Details on the data are given 
in the appendix. Such an index of bank deposits should reflect any banking crisis that 
was large enough to threaten the currency of a country. However, this is arguably a 
rough proxy – ignoring for example any “structural” weaknesses of a country’s 
banking sector. As argued in Temin (2008), and in a modified version also in 
Grossman (1994), adherence to the gold standard tended to increase the vulnerability 
of European banks. If so, the longer a given country stayed on gold, the higher ceteris 
paribus the probability that a banking crisis occurs. These ideas can be tested in a 
model with positive duration dependence: if our banking crisis index helps to predict 
a currency crisis after controlling for the time a country spent on gold, this would 
indicate that there were other, additional “structural” factors at work as suggested in 
third generation models and as argued for example in Schnabel (2004). In addition to 
this, I will control for a country’s status as debtor or creditor during the period 1928-
1936 according to their annual balance of payment statistics (debtor). In general, 
Czechoslovakia, France and Sweden can be classified as creditors, the other countries 
as debtors (Feinstein and Watson 1995). I also tested for an alternative, where France 
is seen as a creditor until 1933, and as a debtor thereafter (see Feinstein et al. 1997).  
 
The argument that various factors “conditioned” the development of 
macroeconomic fundamentals is captured by several variables. First, I control for the 
parity at which a country resumed the gold standard in the 1920s as a percentage of its 
pre-war parity (devalhist), varying from values close to 0 to 100. Note that this can 
also be interpreted as reflecting differences in perceived “credibility” or a “fear of 
floating”. For example, a significantly positive coefficient on this variable would 
indicate that countries, which returned to gold at parity much below the pre-war 
parity, were ceteris paribus less prone to exit gold. This could support the idea that 
they simply weathered the crisis more easily or that they were eager to stick to the 
gold-standard in fear that an exit would undermine their credibility. However, we can 
try to distinguish these two arguments by interacting the effect of devaluation with the 
status of a debtor, because a “fear of floating”-type argument should apply only to 
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to capture the idea that conditions in international trade affected a country’s ability to 
adhere to gold. The argument that Germany faced a regime change in terms of access 
to international capital markets after first announcements of the Young-Plan is 
captured by a dummy Young29, which is one for Germany from March 1929 onwards 
and zero else. While again, this is a somewhat simplistic approach, it should help to 
capture the fundamental change in Germany’s access to international capital by 
allowing for a change in Germany’s baseline hazard from March 1929 onwards. 
Finally, I also include the monthly (gold-) value of a country’s net-exports (netex). 
 
The commitment to defend the gold standard in month t+1 should be all the 
more credible, the higher a country’s reserves in gold and foreign exchange in month 
t. relative to the amount of circulating coins and notes. Hence, I include the “cover 
ratio” defined as the ratio of gold and reserves relative to M0 as a regressor. 
Moreover, I add an indicator variable ukus_offgold to capture the effect of the two 
leading economies of the interwar period - the UK and the USA - leaving the gold 
standard on the sample countries (the variable equals 0 as long as both are still on 
gold, 1 after the UK left gold, and 2 when both are off gold). A significant coefficient 
with a positive sign could indicate that the exit of these core countries out of the gold 
exchange system undermined the credibility of further adherence to it and hence 
increased the probability that other countries follow off gold. Further aspects of 
second generation models are captured by variables that reflect the degree of Central 
Bank independence and the character of the political regime. For the former, I use a 
measure of central bank independence (indep) from Simmons (1994) that varies from 
4 (non-existent government input) to 1 (chief executives and board of bank appointed 
by the government) and changes over time. The hypothesis here is that a more 
independent Central Bank should be better able to exit gold as the loss in credibility 
associated with this step should be lower. The political regime is captured by polity, a 
variable that varies from +10 to -10, taken from POLITY IV (Marshall and Jaggers 
2005). The variable reflects a combined score on a democracy variable (0-10) and an 
autocracy variable (0-10) and is computed by subtracting autocracy from democracy. 
Both, autocracy from democracy are based on weighted indicators of the 
competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of 
executive recruitment and constraints on the chief executive. The POLITY IV 
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variables on a monthly base.  
 
Finally, I test the idea that patterns of integration might have affected a 
country’s decision to either join the Sterling-Bloc or the Reichsmark-Bloc or hence 
leave the gold standard or to join the Gold-Bloc and hence stay on Gold as discussed 
in Ritschl and N. Wolf (2003). I use their estimates of bilateral trade integration with 
the potential anchor countries Great Britain, Germany, and France, based on a gravity 
model of bilateral trade flows for 1928 to construct a set of indicator variables: 
int28_f, int28_g, int28_uk. This measure captures the idea of integration in the sense 
of (positive or negative) deviation from “normalized” bilateral trade flows after 
controlling for geographical proximity and the sizes of trading partners, hence a 
country can well be better integrated with its second largest trading partner than with 
its largest trading partner. As shown in Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) and Ritschl and 
Wolf (2003), these patterns of trade integration were very stable over the period 1928-
1938. Note that each indicator variable will have the value of zero when the 
difference between observed and “normalized” bilateral trade flows is smaller than 
one standard deviation.
3 To account for other trade-network effects, I also include a 
dummy variable tradegold, which equals 1 as long as the country’s major trading 
partner is still on the gold standard and 0 else.  
 
IV. Results and Interpretation 
 
In all the following estimations, the dependent variable equals “zero” in any 
month when the country adheres to the gold standard and equals “one” in the month 
that the spell ends. After the spell has ended, the country drops out of the sample (see 
Klein and Marion 1997). Here, exit is defined as either the imposition of exchange 
controls or devaluation (whatever occurred earlier). The explanatory variables are 
always introduced with a one-month time lag. 
 
                                                 
3 Ritschl and Wolf (2003) use several specifications of the gravity model. The integration indicator 
here is based on a scaled OLS estimator with country effects, which implements the model of Anderson 
and van Wincoop (2003). I tested for various other specifications, which did not alter the basic results.  
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estimate a logit-model (equivalent to a proportional odds model), where I assume that 
the baseline hazard rate is constant and common for all countries (column 1). Next, I 
repeat this for a “log-log” or extreme value specification (equivalent to a proportional 
hazards model in discrete time).  
 
Table 1: Discrete Time Survival Models, January 1928-December 1936 
(Binary dependent variable = 1 in the month of exit; robust standard errors given in parentheses, bold 
letters indicate significance at 10% or better) 
 
  Model 1: Proportional odds 
model (logit) 
Model 2: Proportional hazards 
model (extreme value) 
Baseline Hazard: constant  63.187 (1.900)  22.606 (2.555) 
Whole28  -0.473 (-2.752)  -0.151 (-4.248) 
Unrate  -14.632 (-0.357)  4.166 (0.178) 
Ind28  0.03 (0.191)  0.029 (1.025) 
Banking  -0.485 (-1.749)  -0.168 (-2.851) 
Debtor  6.901 (1.249)  4.037 (1.016) 
Devalhist  0.224 (1.971)  0.107 (1.903) 
Young29  7.604 (0.521)  1.494 (0.432) 
Netex  0.001 (0.084)  -0.012 (-0.378) 
Cover  -7.319 (-2.015)  -8.389 (-0.806) 
UKUS_off  -0.265 (-0.136)  -0.220 (-0.364) 
Indep  3.343 (1.545)  0.091 (1.984) 
Polity  1.660 (2.074)  0.587 (2.843) 
Int_France  -3.443 (-1.828)  -1.119 (-2.650) 
Int_UK  -0.215 (-0.303)  -0.039 (-0.193) 
Int_Germany  -0.120 (-0.601)  -0.102 (-0.467) 
Tradegold  -1.19 (-1.924)  -3.289 (-1.449) 
# of Observations  461 461 
McFadden R2  0.562 0.599 
Akaike Criterion  0.150 0.144 
Schwarz Criterion  0.303 0.296 
 
The overall fit of the two models is good and quite similar, with a McFadden 
R2 of 0.56 and 0.60 respectively. It is useful to recall that the estimated coefficients 
under the logistic and the log-log link-functions need to be standardised before 
comparison, as the underlying distributions have a different variance: π/3 and π/6 
respectively. Hence, the coefficients estimated under the logit-model should be 
divided by two to be comparable to the coefficients estimated under the log-log-
model. After this, it becomes apparent that the coefficients are similar under the two 
models. Note also that the estimated coefficients do not directly reflect the marginal 
effects on the dependent variable, but they do reflect the sign of the marginal effect 
and whether the effect is significant or not. Not surprisingly, according to both models 
there is a positive baseline hazard to exit gold at any time between January 1928 and 
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As expected, the higher the level of wholesale prices relative to 1928, the lower the 
probability that a country leaves gold. Also, neither the rate of industrial production, 
nor the rate of unemployment have a significant impact on exit after controlling for 
deflation just because the former are to a large degree driven by the latter (Newell an 
Symons 1988, Bernanke and James 1991). It is interesting to see that the level of bank 
deposits (banking) still helps to predict the exit from gold after many other controls. 
This seems to support the claim of James (1984) and Schnabel (2004) that the 
financial sector mattered for the currency crisis in addition to other factors. However, 
we will have to test, whether this still holds after controlling for the time a country has 
spent on gold.  
 
There is also some evidence that various “conditioning” factors mattered that 
affected macroeconomic fundamentals in different countries. Debtor countries were 
somewhat more prone to exit gold than creditors, but the effect is not significant. 
However, countries, which had returned on gold only after a significant devaluation in 
the 1920s were – ceteris paribus - more prone to stay on the gold-exchange standard. 
As argued above, this might support both, the idea that they simply weathered the 
crisis more easily (which would fit the case of France) or that they were eager to stick 
to the gold-standard in fear that an exit would undermine their credibility (which 
might help to understand the case of Poland). Our approach does not help to support 
the hypothesis that Germany faced a credit constraint after information about the 
abolishment of “transfer-protection” spread during the Young-Plan negotiations in 
1929. The coefficient has the right sign but it is not significant. In part, the new credit 
constraints under the Young-Plan were of course reflected in other variables, 
especially in an immediate run on the reserves and a critical decline in Germany’s 
cover ratio (from about 50% in February 1929 to 47% in March and 34% in May 
1929). However, other factor helped to improve the cover ratio from May 1929 
onwards, masking the Young Plan effect in our estimation. Similarly, there was a 
decline in the volume of bank deposits, which dropped between March and May 1929 
but recovered thereafter. And not at least, the Young loan and other politically 
negotiated credits may have mitigated any adverse effects of the Young plan before 
  19the end of 1930.
4 Essentially, this finding shows the limits of our approach: if we 
would limit the time horizon of the model to 1929, there would be no identifying 
variation in the dependent variable any more, as no country did actually leave the gold 
standard. But estimation with any longer time horizons will make it hard to find any 
effect with the given dataset.  
 
Other results of Table 1 are more clear-cut. Among the other factors that 
condition the hazard rate over time, the cover ratio, central bank independence, the 
political regime, and the pattern of trade integration seem to matter empirically. We 
introduced the cover ratio to capture the credibility of further adherence to gold and 
not surprisingly we find that the higher the cover ratio, the lower probability to exit. 
The positive and significant coefficient on indep suggests that Central Bank 
independence helped to release the Golden Fetters, ceteris paribus. This can be 
interpreted along a second generation model, where the loss in credibility associated 
with the “broken promise” of exit from gold is limited due to a public belief in the 
Central Bank’s commitment to limit inflation. Related to this, the positive and always 
significant coefficient on the polity variable suggests that institutionalised 
democracies indeed tended to leave the gold-exchange standard earlier, as has been 
argued by Simmons (1994), Eichengreen and Simmons (1995) and James (2001). 
Finally, these first estimations show that some specific aspects of the European trade 
pattern mattered for monetary policy. Ceteris paribus, countries followed their main 
trading partner either to stay on gold or to exit: recall that we defined the variable 
tradegold as 1 whenever a country’s main trading partner was on gold, and 0 else. 
However, intriguingly, in addition to this there is strong evidence that the degree of 
trade integration with France (as in 1928) helps to predict exit. Countries that were 
poorly integrated with France were more prone to exit, after controlling for many 
other factors. For example, a gravity model of bilateral trade estimated for 1928 
shows that Poland traded much more with France than predicted by a gravity model 
based on their respective economic sizes and geographical position. This result is 
robust to various specifications of the indicator variable based on various 
specifications of the gravity model (see Ritschl and Wolf 2003). I will explore in 
section V below in more detail, which factors might account for this curious result.  
                                                 
4 I am grateful to an anonymous referee who brought this to my attention. 
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In a next step, I relax the assumption that duration dependence is constant over 
time and more generally, that the effect of the conditioning factors is constant over 
time. To explore the time structure more closely, I must save on degrees of freedom 
and will consider only those coefficients that were significant at a 10% level in at 
least one specification of Table 1. Note, that this elimination of insignificant 
regressors has only minor effects on the coefficients of the remaining variables. In 
Table 2, columns 1 (model 3) and 2 (model 4), I re-estimate the logit- and the 
extreme-value-models with the assumption that the baseline hazard for each country 
varies with the time that has elapsed after the country resumed the gold standard in 
the 1920s (in months).  
 
Table 2: Discrete Time Survival Models, January 1928-December 1936 with positive 
duration dependence (Binary dependent variable = 1 in the month of exit; robust standard errors 
given in parentheses, bold letters indicate significance at 10% or better) 
 










18.455 (0.779)  4.417 (0.511)  -26.891 (-0.195)  -5.269 (-0.850) 
Baseline Hazard: 
months on gold 
3.770 (0.529)  0.227 (1.559) 
Baseline Hazard: 
months on gold X 
Debtor 
1.607 (2.303)  1.037 (2.538) 
1.988 (4.400)  0.171 (2.554) 
Whole28  -2.039 (-1.786)  -1.195 (-2.247)  -2.821 (-1.987)  -0.127 (-2.484) 
Banking  -1.003 (-0.223)  -0.036 (-0.432) 
Banking X Debtor 
-0.387 (-2.865)  -0.254 (-2.152) 
-1.092 (-1.775)  -0.076 (-2.063) 
Devalhist  0.520 (2.297)  0.329 (2.680)  -1.012 (-0.691)  -0.027 (-0.481) 
Cover  -8.152 (-2.194)  -5.221 (-1.607)  -10.399 (-2.198)  -3.219 (-1.862) 
Indep  10.526 (2.684)  7.229 (2.148)  8.557 (1.447)  4.555 (1.695) 
Polity  3.103 (2.025)  1.887 (2.372)  0.681 (1.811)  0.107 (1.757) 
Int_France  -10.719 (-2.191)  -6.697 (-2.487)  -9.518 (-1.634)  -8.686 (-3.562) 
Tradegold  -3.426 (-2.482)  -2.225 (-2.622)  -2.044 (-1.560)  -3.383 (-3.764) 
# of Obs.  484 484 484 484 
McFadden R2  0.811 0.785 0.860 0.759 
Akaike Criterion  0.073 0.077 0.073 0.090 
Schwarz Criterion  0.160 0.164 0.177 0.194 
 
 
Generally, there is strong evidence for positive duration dependence: the 
longer a country stayed on gold, the higher the probability to exit. As argued above, 
there is actually an interpretation for this effect along the lines of Temin (2008). Note 
however, that nearly all other conditioning factors remain highly significant with the 
same signs as in Table 1. Especially, the banking crisis indicator continues to matter: 
  21if indeed adherence to the gold standard tended to increase the vulnerability of 
European banks as argued in Temin (2008) and Grossman (1994), there is some 
evidence that other “structural” factors mattered as well, as suggested in third 
generation models. It is the very point of Schnabel’s (2004) argument that a currency 
and a banking crisis occurred at the same time, but for possibly different reasons.  
 
But why exactly did adherence to the gold-exchange standard contribute to 
currency crises and possibly “twin crises” in the 1930s? The key mechanism 
suggested in Eichengreen (1992) is that tightening monetary conditions in the main 
capital exporting countries spilled over into capital importing countries in their 
attempt to prevent capital outflows. The implied deflation put these countries between 
“Scylla and Charybdis” as real wages and real interest rates increased to unseen 
levels: in an attempt to rescue the currency, they wrecked the economy. As argued 
earlier, this mechanism could have triggered “twin crises” in debtor countries as 
observed for example in Germany, Austria or Hungary. We can easily test for this 
idea by estimating both, duration dependence and the banking crisis indicator 
separately for creditor and debtor countries. As shown in Table 2, columns 3 (model 
5) and 4 (model 6), the data support exactly this: it was the debtor countries that 
suffered the more the longer they stayed on gold. And it is only in these countries that 
in addition to other factors a banking crisis helps to predict the occurrence of a 
currency crisis.  
 
The other rather specific assumption that I made in all estimations so far is that 
coefficients are stable over time. Especially, the trade pattern that was highly 
persistent over the entire interwar period may have affected the pattern of monetary 
policy choices differently at different points in time. And this should be so, because of 
differences between countries. For example, if economic integration with France 
would pick up some factors specific for the later members of the Gold Bloc (in our 
sample Italy and Poland besides France), this factor should be stronger after 1931. In 
Table 3, columns 1 and 2, I show that indeed this is borne out by the data: while the 
other coefficients are largely unchanged according to both, the Cox proportional 
hazard model (extreme value), and the proportional odds model (logit), the degree of 
trade integration with France has the same sign as before but is insignificant if we 
limit attention to January 1928-December 1931. We will have to explore what 
  22particular factors characterised the economic relations with France for those countries 
that stayed on gold after 1931.   
 
Table 3: Discrete Time Survival Models, January 1928-December 1931 
(Binary dependent variable = 1 in the month of exit; robust standard errors given in parentheses, bold 
letters indicate significance at 10% or better) 
 
  Proportional odds model (logit) Proportional  hazards  model 
(extreme value) 
Baseline Hazard: constant  44.038 (2.474)  87.938 (3.460) 
Whole28  -0.490 (-4.259)  -0.951 (-3.029) 
Banking  -0.495 (-2.335)  -0.286 (-2.732) 
Devalhist  0.186 (3.235)  0.072 (2.894) 
Cover  -4.049 (-3.053)  -5.172 (-3.699) 
Indep  3.204 (3.835)  4.149 (1.543) 
Polity  0.963 (7.903)  1.732 (4.325) 
Int_France  -0.765 (-0.742)  0.452 (1.030) 
Tradegold  -0.698 (-4.649)  -0.655 (-2.531) 
# of Obs.  342 342 
McFadden R2  0.953 0.939 
 
Finally, these various models apparently all help predicting the exit from gold, 
but which one is the most appropriate? Actually, there are two dimensions related to 
our basic question “Why were some more inclined than others to release their gold 
fetters?” (Eichengreen 1992). First, what model is most suitable to predict the general 
pattern of exit from the gold-exchange standard in our sample? Second, what model is 
best suited to predict exit country-by-country? For example, some model might be 
able to predict the very month of exit for some countries, but entirely fail with respect 
to other countries’ experience. Another model might not predict the exact month of 
exit for any single country in the sample, but still help to predict the overall exit 
pattern better than any other model. Therefore, I suggest assessing the model fit with 
several approaches. To assess the overall fit, I compare the different models in Tables 
1 and 2 according to various standard information criteria (McFadden R2, Akaike, 
and Schwarz). Second, I will consider the ability of the various models to predict the 
exit from gold overall, and country by country.  
 
The evidence on McFadden R
2 and the Information Criteria in Tables 1 and 2 
suggests that we should take the time a country has spent on gold into account, as this 
does improve the overall model fit. Moreover, the proportional odds model (logit) 
specifications generally fit the data slightly better. Models 3 and 5 have the same 
Akaike statistic, but model 5 has a higher (“worse”) Schwarz statistic (because this 
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other hand, model 5 shows the highest McFadden R-Squared. But is there any model 
that can predict the very month of exit for any sample country? Table 4 summarises 
how exactly the various models help to predict the pattern of exit, month by month. 
 
Table 4: Assessing the model fit: prediction 
 
  Dep = 0, % Correct  Dep = 1, % Correct  Percent Gain against 
Default 
Model 1 (Table 1,1)  99.03  44.86  43.92 
Model 2 (Table 1,2)  99.18  45.13  48.50 
Model 3 (Table 2,1)  99.56  73.78  73.26 
Model 4 (Table 2,2)  99.38  69.02  65.52 
Model 5 (table 2,3)  99.69  83.37  82.18 
Model 6 (Table 2,4)  99.39  52.31  57.30 
 
 
The first column of Table 4 shows how often a given model correctly 
predicted that a country would stay on gold (dependent variable = 0). Column 2 
shows evidence on a much tougher test: how often a model correctly predicted that a 
country would leave gold (dependent variable = 1). Column 3 shows, how much a 
model improves the prediction compared to a default model that simply assumes some 
constant probability to exit (in terms of formula (1) this is a constant baseline hazard 
rate where all conditioning factors X(t) are set to zero). Reassuringly, all models do 
much better than the default, but only models 3 and 5 have a reasonable hit rate above 
50% in predicting the very month of exit (column 2). In the next section I will briefly 
explore what countries are better predicted by what model, and suggest some 
hypotheses for the particular evidence on France and Poland. 
 
V. Back to the details: country experiences on a comparative background 
 
The above models could explain the pattern of exit relatively well, but we still 
don not know, which countries deviated from that pattern and what factors actually 
determined the prediction for specific countries. To start with, Table 5 contrasts the 




  24Table 5: Actual and Predicted Exit Dates (bold letters indicate failure to predict) 
 
 
Predicted Exit  Actual Exit 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Austria  09/1931 09/1931 09/1931 09/1931 09/1931 09/1931 09/1931 
CZ  09/1931 09/1931 09/1931 09/1931 09/1931 09/1931 09/1931 
France 09/1936  05/1936 05/1936 07/1936 06/1936 07/1936 05/1936 
Germany  07/1931 07/1931 07/1931 07/1931 07/1931 07/1931 07/1931 
Hungary 07/1931  01/1931  07/1931  08/1931 12/1931 07/1931  12/1931 
Italy 05/1934  06/1933 07/  1933 05/1934 05/1934 05/1934 04/1934 
Poland 04/1936  10/ 1934  01/ 1935  04/1936 04/1936 04/1936 03/ 1936 
Sweden  09/1931 09/1931 09/1931 09/1931 09/1931 09/1931 09/1931 
Models 3 and 5 are nearly identical; except that model 3 wrongly predicts the 
exit of Hungary in August instead of July 1931. Actually the survival probability stays 
at just 50.5 % in July 1931 according to model 3. Apart form this, it clearly stands out 
that the very month of exit for four countries is always correctly predicted: the exit of 
Austria, Czechoslovakia and Sweden in September 1931 and that of Germany in July 
1931. It also stands out that no model can correctly predict the exit of France as late as 
September 1936. All models predict that France will stay on gold well into 1936, but 
predict exit somewhere between May and July 1936. Finally, table 5 suggests that 
Poland seems to be a rather difficult case as well: here, exit is predicted to occur 
somewhere over a time span of 18 months, between October 1934 and April 1936. Let 
us briefly inspect the cases of France and Poland somewhat closer. 
 
France was clearly under less pressure to leave the gold-exchange standard in 
the early 1930s than any other country in the sample (and probably in the world). 
After Britain’s exit from gold in 1931, France continued to attract gold; the cover 
ratio remained steadily high. Similarly, after the US devaluation in 1933, this did not 
immediately weaken the French position. However, it became increasingly clear that 
France had lost any competitive advantage that it may have had due to an initially 
“undervalued” currency. As argued by Paul Reynaud in his “devaluation” speech to 
the Chamber of Deputies in June 1934, France and the Gold Bloc (Italy, Belgium, 
Holland, Switzerland, and - informally - Poland) had become the most expensive 
countries in the world. And further price domestic deflation apparently hindered 
recovery as the contrast with countries that had devalued showed (see Mouré 1988, p. 
487). Indeed, while industrial production started to recover from the depression in 
most countries in late 1932, this recovery came to a halt in France in mid 1933, just 
  25after the US had left gold. On the other hand, French unemployment was slowly rising 
but still markedly below the European average, gold reserves stayed high and the 
financial sector seemed to be resilient. For example, our index of bank deposits (1928 
= 100) still stood at 95.6 in 1934. While there is evidence that some pressure to leave 
gold was build up over the year 1935, and many signs indicate changes in the public 
opinion, a real change occurred only in late 1935: the cover ratio started to decline 
between December 1935 and January 1936, and bank deposits started to be 
withdrawn. After the Front Populaire, which rejected further deflation (at least in the 
election programme) had won the elections in May 1936, these pressures increased 
very sharply with the index of bank deposits declining from 84.5 in April 1936 to 77.8 
in July 1936, and the cover ratio plummeting over the same time from 80.3 to 65.2. 
 
 So, why did even the Front Populaire government under Léon Blum not leave 
gold in July 1936? Mouré (1988) argued that the French government attempted to 
coordinate devaluation with Britain, the USA, and other countries, which took time. 
Interestingly, one final impulse to exit came from the military. When the government 
announced a new 21 billion franc rearmament program in early September, partly in 
response to the lengthening of German military service in late August, capital outflow 
accelerated. Bank of France reserves were again falling sharply, and France finally 
devalued on 25 September 1936 (Frankenstein 1982). 
 
A closely related case, which has been largely neglected so far in the 
literature, is that of Poland. Poland was the only debtor country that joined the Gold-
Bloc in 1933 and stands out in comparison to all her neighbours, especially 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary. According to table 5, models 1 and 2 have some 
difficulties to predict Poland’s exit as late as March 1936, while models 3-6 do rather 
well. Let us briefly explore what factors actually drive this prediction. To this end, I 
simulated model 3 and constructed various counterfactuals to show, what factors 
prevented that Poland left the gold-exchange standard earlier, compared to the case of 
Czechoslovakia. Basically, according to the econometric results, sharp price deflation, 
a run on banks, and a loss in Central Bank reserves relative to circulating money 
create pressure to exit. The longer a country has stayed already on gold, the higher are 
these pressures. On the other hand, the more a country had devalued relative to pre-
war parity when it entered the gold-exchange standard, the less independent the 
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economic partners stay on gold, the later exit will occur. As seen above, model 3 
correctly predicts that Poland leaves not before March 1936, while for example 
Czechoslovakia is correctly predicted to leave in September 1931, four and a halve 
years later. What are the factors that drive this massive difference?  
 
Poland and Czechoslovakia experienced a very similar price deflation until 
mid 1932, when prices in Czechoslovakia started to stabilise, but continued to decline 
in Poland. Both countries also experienced rather similar bank runs in 1931, with the 
difference that this implied a much more limited drain on Poland’s reserves compared 
to Czechoslovakia for two reasons. First, Poland had built up a higher stock of 
reserves relative to monetary aggregates over the years 1928-1929. Second, the Polish 
economy was significantly less monetized such that both the number of circulating 
money per capita and average bank deposits per capita were much below the figures 
for Czechoslovakia. Therefore, while the cover ratio (reserves over M0) in 
Czechoslovakia declined from about 60% in January 1931 to about 42% in September 
1931, the corresponding figures for Poland were 77% in January 1931 and 68% in 
September 1931. While the levels of Central Bank independence in both countries 
were comparable over this period (see Simmons 1994), Poland was a much more 
authoritarian regime. The polity indicator gives a value of -3 for the period after 
Piłsudski’s coup d’état in May 1926 until the new constitution in 1935, when the 
indicators declines to -6.  Instead, Czechoslovakia was a rather stable democracy with 
a polity score of 7 over the period. Finally, the indicator of trade integration from 
Ritschl and Wolf (2003) shows that Poland traded significantly more with France, 
while Czechoslovakia significantly less. The indicators for Polish-French bilateral 
trade based on a Scaled OLS specification stay at 0.27 (PL) and -0.58 (CZ), based on 
a Tobit estimator at 1.48 (PL) and 1.1 (CZ), or based on a Poisson estimator at 13.7 
(PL) and -16.6 (CZ). What would the model predict when we counterfactually assume 
that instead Poland was as poorly integrated with France as Czechoslovakia? Or that 
Poland would be as democratic as Czechoslovakia in the Interwar Period? Table 6 




  27Table 6: Actual and Counterfactual Exit Dates for Poland, based on Model 3 
 




04/ 1936  07/ 1934  12/ 1932  03/ 1932 
 
 
With the polity-score of Czechoslovakia, the model would predict a Polish exit 
already in July 1934, shortly after Italy. The cover ratio in July 1934 was still about 
60%, but a continuing sharp price deflation put the Polish economy under pressure. 
What apparently worked against this was a high degree of adherence to France, rather 
than to gold: with the counterfactual that Poland was as poorly integrated with France 
as Czechoslovakia the model would predict an exit already in December 1932.  
 
The notion of high trade integration with France in 1928 - with Germany still 
being Poland’s largest trading partner - and the empirical effect of the polity score 
variable hardly provide a satisfying “explanation” for Poland’s belated exit decision. 
However, they give a hint that an answer will have to take political factors into 
account, and that Poland’s relations with France played a specific role. Let me briefly 
sketch-out such an explanation (for further details see Wolf 2007). The Piłsudski 
regime that ruled Poland since May 1926 was mainly concerned with strategies to 
defend the independence and territorial integrity of the new Polish state against 
foreign aggression (especially from Germany and the USSR, see Wandycz 1988). The 
perceived risk that leaving the gold standard can produce monetary instability was in 
part due to the Polish experience of hyperinflation until 1923 followed by a second 
inflation in 1925-26 (as for example argued in the earlier Polish literature, see 
Knakiewicz 1967). But in difference to other countries that experienced a 
hyperinflation in the 1920s (such as Austria or Hungary), the Polish government was 
afraid of an additional cost of leaving gold: loosing acess to „friendly” capital in terms 
of the political system of Versailles. For example, in August 1931 (!) the Polish 
chargé d’affaires Muehlstein discussed in Paris the possibilities to replace the 
influence of German banks in Upper Silesia by French capital. “As long as the 
situation was normal, the fight with the German banks was very difficult, but now, 
when the German krach had undermined their authority, it would just be a political 
sin not to use this opportunity and not to try to replace the German capital by French 
  28capital”.
5 At the same time, the question of how to finance the urgent modernization 
of the Polish army came up again because the depression started to produce growing 
budget deficits and because the government feared the growing political instability in 
Germany. After a Polish attempt in July 1929 to negotiate a new French armament 
credit over 1.5 billion Francs had failed, renewed efforts to at least get the final 
instalment of the 1921 credit – frozen since Locarno - succeeded in February 1931. 
The deliveries were scheduled for May 1931 until December 1933 (Ciałowicz 1970, 
p. 162f). After this, the Polish side immediately attempted to discuss a new armament 
credit via ambassador Chłapowski in Paris. When this failed, Piłsudski sent a special 
envoy Targowski to Paris in November 1931 to explore chances for private armament 
credits (ibidem, p. 164) followed by an official request of the Polish General Staff 
about the price for a large delivery of heavy weapons. Note that the General Staff was 
eager to stress in this request the inability of Poland to realize a cash-transaction 
(ibidem, p. 166).  
 
In this political environment of 1931 it is hardly surprising that Poland 
followed neither Germany (still her largest trading partner) nor later Britain off gold. 
In addition to a possible risk of inflation, the Polish government feared to lose access 
to French capital when it felt to need it most. Polish monetary policy apparently 
hinged to a large degree on the strategic considerations of the authoritarian regime. 
Two further aspects support this view. First, in May 1931 Marshall Józef Piłsudski 
made his brother Jan minister of finance. He did this obviously to tighten his personal 
grip on economic policy because his brother had little expertise in monetary policy. 
Jan Piłsudski was followed in September 1931 by W. M. Zawadzki, an eminent Polish 
economist, founding member of the Econometric Society, classical hardliner of 
orthodox monetary policy, and a confident of Piłsudski (Landau and Tomaszewski 
1965). In a private memorandum of late 1935 Zawadzki recapitulated his monetary 
policy. Importantly, this memorandum was never meant for publication (see Landau 
and Tomaszewski 1965). Zawadzki stressed that his monetary policy was based on 
two principles: first, to finance the military (!) budget of the Polish state to which the 
whole economy must be adapted, and related to his second, to stick to the gold 
exchange standard. He describes his motivation for the latter as threefold: first, to gain 
                                                 
5 Own translation from a Letter of Muehlstein to Polish Foreign Minister Zaleski, August 8, 1931, cited 
after Landau and Tomaszewski (1964), p. 315.  
  29access to foreign capital. Second, to avoid domestic turmoil after a destabilization of 
the currency that could undermine the authority of the regime. And finally third, 
Zawadzki mentions the fact that a devaluation of the Złoty would “automatically 
decrease the military budget”, because it would decrease its purchasing power 
abroad.
6 In addition, he was positively convinced that it was possible to overcome the 
crisis by a downward adjustment of prices,
7 and pursued this policy until his 
demission in October 1935. 
 
Among the several effects of the death of Marshall Piłsudski in May 1935 was 
the political comeback of Kwiatkowski, “father of the harbour of Gdynia” who stood 
for the idea to reduce the economic dependency on German trade. In October 1935 
Kwiatkowski replaced Zawadzki as minister of finance, and in December 1935 the 
Cabinet decided on a 4-year investment plan, that merged older plans for “big-push” 
industrialization with plans for setting up a large-scale Polish armament industry to be 
concentrated in the “Security Triangle” formed by Vistula and San (see Strobel 1975, 
Landau and Tomaszewski 1999). In the meantime the economic pressure to finally 
release the “golden fetters” had increased sharply, with a large decline in Poland’s 
reserves from mid-1935 onwards, mainly due to the imposition of new exchange 
restrictions in Germany and elsewhere. Poland’s membership in the Gold-Bloc had 
become a mere façade without any economic foundations.  
 
The time to act finally came in March 1936 with the remilitarization of the 
Rhineland, when Germany de facto cancelled the treaty of Locarno: a major threat to 
Poland. Poland signalled her preparation to support France in an armed conflict in the 
spirit of the 1921 convention, but France did not react (Ciałowicz 1970, p. 216f). 
Moreover, the changing political climate in France, with an expected success of 
Blum’s Front Populaire questioned the future of the gold bloc altogether (Mouré 
2002, p. 209ff.). On April 9th, 1936 a National Defence Fund was set up by 
presidential decree to be equipped with 1 billion Złoty over the period 1937-40 in 
order to finance the modernization of Poland’s army (Krzyżanowski 1976, p. 146), 
apparently in anticipation of a radical change in monetary policy. Only two weeks 
                                                 
6 Zawadzki (1935), reprinted in Landau and Tomaszewski (1965), pp. 127-151, here especially page 
134.  
7 Ibidem, p. 132. 
  30later, on April 26
th another presidential decree introduced exchange controls, and 
thereby ended Poland’s adherence to the gold-exchange standard. The half-official 
Monthly Bulletin of the state-owned Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK), 
published in French, defended this step as follows: “Therefore, the introduction of 
exchange controls was not directly determined by economic difficulties. The Polish 
government saw itself forced to this radical step in the first place in order to fight the 
currency speculation, which has developed recently and to stop the tendencies of 
hoarding, encouraged mainly by events from the domain of international politics. The 
aggravation of the political situation in Europe and the threat of war had a negative 
impact on all countries and in the first place on the members of the Gold Bloc (…).” 
(BGK 1936, Revue Mensuelle IX (4), p. 2).    
 
VII. Conclusion  
 
Germany left the gold-exchange standard in July 1931, soon followed by the 
Habsburg successors Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia and also Sweden in 
September 1931. Italy left gold only in 1934, while France in the west and Poland in 
the east adhered to the gold-exchange standard until the bitter end in 1936.  I argued 
that theoretical models of currency crises starting with Krugman (1979) over Obstfeld 
(1986) to Krugman (1998) are very helpful to understand this pattern and to organise 
the vast empirical literature on the interwar experience. In a flexible econometric 
framework that allows for various specifications of discrete time survival models, I 
find that a key factor was the extent of deflationary pressure that each country faced, 
which might have triggered both rising unemployment and “debt deflation”. However, 
many factors conditioned its impact. There is evidence that the experience of a 
banking crisis was an independent additional factor in debtor countries, in line with 
third-generation models of currency crises. Moreover, the ability to defend further 
adherence to gold – as reflected in the cover ratio - affected the exit decisions. And 
this ability in turn depended on the character of the political regime, the independence 
of the Central Bank, and not at least on previous devaluations, very much along the 
lines of a second generation model. Finally, there is evidence that the pattern of trade 
integration across Europe helps to explain the exit decisions. An econometric model 
that nests these various factors can explain all variation in the sample with the 
  31exception of France, which is always predicted to leave no later than July 1936 
(instead of September 1936). By closer inspection, it is possible to explain the delay 
of the French exit, while the final trigger was apparently related to a new rearmament 
plan. Moreover, I demonstrated for the case of Poland how my empirical framework 
can be use to construct some interesting counterfactuals. For example, the model 
would predict that Poland would leave gold already in late 1932 (instead of early 
1936), if Poland would have been as democratic as Czechoslovakia and if her 
economic links to France would have been weaker.  Archival evidence on the factors 
that determined Poland’s monetary policy 1930-1935 clearly support that a strategic 
partnership with France had a crucial impact. Nevertheless, while this approach 
certainly helps to understand “Why were some more inclined than others to release 
their gold fetters?” (Eichengreen 1992), there are obviously still many open issues. 
Most importantly, further work should extend the sample of countries and try to take 
the network of bilateral economic relations into account, beyond the network of trade 
flows used here. Especially, new evidence of the pattern of bilateral financial relations 
could be of considerable value. 
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